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LABOR LAW: UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN EMPLOYEES,
BARGAINING ORDERS, EXHAUSTION, AND
OTHER SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES
CHRISTINE GODSIL COOPER*

The most significant recent development in the Seventh Circuit in
the area of labor relations is the holding that undocumented alien
workers,' as employees under the National Labor Relations Act, 2 are
entitled to the protections and benefits of that statute. 3 The bulk of the
remaining cases decided by the Seventh Circuit in the past year were
resolved on the basis of established precedent. 4 This circuit has continued the nationwide trend of denying the National Labor Relations
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University Law School; B.A., Rosary College; M.A.,
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle; J.D., DePaul University; LL.M., Harvard Law School.
1. The undocumented alien worker is one who is present in the United States without valid
documentation as required by section 212(a)(14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, the following classes of aliens shall be ineligible
to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States:
(14) Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled or
unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers in the
United States who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of aliens
who are members of the teaching profession or who have exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts), and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the
United States and at the place to which the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled
labor, and (B) the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and
working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976). See also Cobian-Hernandez v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 587 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1978); Stenographic Machs., Inc. v. Regional Adm'r for Employment
& Training, 577 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1978).
The undocumented alien worker is variously referred to also as "undocumented worker" or
"illegal alien." It has been suggested that the choice of expression indicates, respectively, whether
the user is sympathetic or hostile to these aliens. There are those who consider the term "illegal
alien" to be perjorative. I do not. But see, Salinas & Torres, The UndocumentedMexican Alien. A
Legal, Social, and Economic Analysis, 13 Hous. L. REV. 863 (1976), where it is noted that "the
United States and Mexico joined in a United Nations resolution which directed the Secretary
General to employ the term nondocumented migratory workers to define those workers who illegally or surreptitiously enter another country to obtain work." Id at 863 n.I, quoting telegram
from the Secretary of State of the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Nov. 1975 (on
file with Houston Law Review).
When the term "illegal alien" is used in this article, it is merely for variety of speech; it is in
no way to be interpreted as exhibiting disrespect to any foreigner. This term was used by the
Seventh Circuit, presumably for the same reasons. See NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355,
358 (7th Cir. 1978). The term was also used by the United States Supreme Court in DeCanas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
2. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
3. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1978).
4. See text accompanying notes 132-253 infra.
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Board's Gissel bargaining orders' and also has chastised the Board for
inadequate or improper decisions. 6 The doctrines of exhaustion of internal union remedies and exhaustion of grievance procedures 7 were
recurring issues in the Seventh Circuit in the past year, as was the duty
8
of fair representation.
This article will analyze the landmark decision of NLRB v. SureTan, Inc.,9 where the Seventh Circuit held that undocumented alien
workers are entitled to protection under the National Labor Relations
Act. In addition, the article will discuss the Seventh Circuit decisions
concerning Gissel bargaining orders and the exhaustion of internal
union remedies and grievance procedures. Finally, this article will note
briefly the remaining labor law cases decided by the Seventh Circuit
from June 1, 1978 to May 31, 1979.10

5. See text accompanying notes 132-54, infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 167-77, infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 178-99, infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 200-10, infra.
9. 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978).
10. This article focuses on cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 15 1-169 (1976); the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976);
and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976)
(collectively referred to as the Labor Act). However, during the preceding year there were important decisions concerning the employment relationship. These are beyond the scope of this article.
but deserve a footnote mention: Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Dept. of Industry, 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir.
1979) (ERISA does not pre-empt application of state fair employment laws to employee benefit
plans); Tri-State Terminals, Inc. v. Jesse, 596 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1979) (disability benefits under
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); Clemons v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.,
596 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1979) (employer liability under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act); Coutu v. Universities Research Ass'n., Inc., 595 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1979)
(Davis-Bacon Act does not require employee suing for back wages to exhaust administrative remedies); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp.. 592 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 99
S. Ct. 2881 (1979) (ERISA provision which subjects employers to liability for payment of unconditionally vested benefits does not contravene the due process clause); Marshall v. Chromalloy Am.
Corp., 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 174 (1979) (anonymous employee
complaint was held sufficient to support OSHA warrant); Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. Marshall, 588
F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1978) (OSHA warrant was upheld even though it misstated a fact); Blocksom
& Co. v. Marshall, 582 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1978) (OSHA is not an impermissible delegation of
legislative authority); Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1978) (ERISA extends federal
jurisdiction to claims that pension trustees have improperly denied pension benefits in violation of
the terms of the pension plan); Barrett v. Grand Trunk W.R.R. Co., 581 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1978)
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1979) (Military Selective Service Act requires that a returning veteran
be given the same employment opportunities he would have enjoyed had he not entered the service).
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SURE-TAN: UNDOCUMENTED ALIEN WORKERS ARE ENTITLED
TO THE PROTECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

Background Considerations
When the National Labor Relations Board I was created in 1935
to administer the National Labor Relations Act,12 it was assigned the
task of supervising representation elections' 3 and adjudicating unfair
labor practice cases.' 4 Since its inception, the role of the Board has
been to insure the rights of the workers in America' 5 to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in peaceful concerted activity toward
those ends or to refrain from those activities. 16 In exercising its powers,
the Board's ultimate purpose is to foster collective bargaining.' 7 Thus,
the Board's bias-if it be that-in favor of unionization is statutorily
mandated.' However, the actual implementation of this bias may not
be in conformity with national labor policy or with important national
objectives. The Board, through its responsibility in representation
cases and unfair labor practice cases,' 9 has enormous power either to
foster or to frustrate national policy on labor relations or other pertinent national objectives. 20 It remains for the courts 2' to harmonize the
II. Hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Board" or as "the NLRB."
12. National Labor Relations Act § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976).
13. Id § 159(c)(1).
14. Id § 160(a).
15. The Sure-Tan case, NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978), makes it inappropriate to speak of the rights of American workers as eligible voters under the National Labor
Relations Act. See text accompanying note 39 infra.
16. The rights of employees under the Act are stated in section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, loin, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
17. The Board's mandate to ensure the section 7 rights can be found at National Labor Relations Act §§ 1, 3, 8-11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 153, 158-161 (1976). Section I states the legislative
policy:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid
or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
18. Id
19. See text accompanying notes 74-90 infra.
20. The decision by the General Counsel of whether to investigate a charge or issue a complaint in an unfair labor practice case is not subject to judicial review. National Labor Relations
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aggressive stance of the National Labor Relations Board with the legislative intent of the National Labor Relations Act 22 or with other fed23
eral laws.
The threshold inquiry for Board intervention in any labor dis24
pute is, of course, jurisdiction. 25 Very recent times have seen expansion of Board jurisdiction: the Board now asserts authority over
condominiums and cooperative associations, 2 6 day care centers, 27 pri29
28
vate companies rendering services to public employers, law firms,
30
and university faculties.
The statutory range 3' of Board jurisdiction extends to the breadth
of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 32 But even
Act § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976). This decision affects the development of the law under the
Act. See, e.g., Report on Case Handling Developments at NLRB, 1977 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 250 (1978). While an unsuccessful company can challenge a representation election by a

refusal to bargain, an unsuccessful union has no such recourse. See note 46 in/ra. Thus, some
decisions of the Board in representation cases can be reviewed by the courts.
21. Judicial review of Board decisions is given to the United States courts of appeals under
section I0(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). See Goldstein, Labor Law.- The Control Function ofthe Court ofAppeals/or the Seventh Circuit, 55 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 155 (1979).

22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
23. See text accompanying notes 91-109 infra.
24. National Labor Relations Act § 2(9), 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1976), defines "labor dispute" to
include:
[Any controversy concernin& terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing,
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
25. The Board has the power to determine any "question of representation affecting commerce" and "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting
commerce." National Labor Relations Act §§ 9(c)(I), 10(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c)(1), 160(a) (1976).
"'[A]ffecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free
" National Labor Relations Act § 2(7), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1976).
flow of commerce...
26. 30 Sutton Place Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 100 L.R.R.M. 1335 (1979), overruling Post
East Condominium Owners Assn., 193 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 78 L.R.R.M. 1107 (1971). The Board will
assert jurisdiction over housing cooperatives and condominiums having gross annual revenues of
at least $500,000.
27. Salt & Pepper Nursery School, 222 N.L.R.B. 1295, 91 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1976). However,
the gross annual revenues must total at least $250,000.
28. See, e.g., NLRB v. California Inspection Rating Bureau, 591 F.2d 56 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted,99 S. Ct. 2886 (1979).
29. Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456, 95 L.R.R.M. 1041 (1977). See also Camden
Legal Servs., 231 N.L.R.B. 224, 95 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1977); Wayne Cty. Legal Servs., 229 N.L.R.B.
1023, 95 L.R.R.M. 1209 (1977). However, gross annual revenue must reach $250,000.
30. Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970). Gross annual revenues
must exceed $1,000,000.
31. See note 25 supra.
32. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). However, the Board need not
exercise jurisdiction this broad. In the interests of manageability, the Board has promulgated
rules for the discretionary exercise of its jurisdiction, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(I) (1976).
These standards usually involve dollar amount minima. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR

LAW 22-23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GORMAN]. See also notes 26-30 supra and note 34 infra.
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when a dispute constitutionally can be the subject of Board jurisdiction,
the Act 33 may impose restrictions on the Board's power. 34 Although
the Act grants to workers the basic section 7 rights, 35 these rights are
granted only to "employees" as defined therein. 36 Only "employees"
can vote in Board-supervised representation elections and persons not
deemed "employees" are not entitled to the protections of the Act. One
of these important protections is the prohibition of employer unfair la37
bor practices that discriminate on the basis of union activities.
Just as the expansion of jurisdiction increases the impact of Board
38
policy, so too does the expansion of the definition of "employee."
The importance of section 7 rights argues for the broadest interpretation of "employee," for only "employees" can address the National Labor Relations Board for protection under the Act. Thus, both
jurisdiction and employee status are fundamental questions in labor
relations law and national policy.
NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc.
A novel and controversial question was presented to the Seventh
Circuit in NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc. 39 Are undocumented workers entitled to the protections of the Act? In Sure-Tan, pursuant to a Boardconducted representation election, the Board certified the union 40 as
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
34. GORMAN, supra note 32, at 26-27. At some point, it should be noted that the Seventh
Circuit relied heavily on this labor law hornbook. See, e.g., Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v.
NLRB, 599 F.2d 227. 229 (7th Cir. 1979); Medline Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 593 F.2d 788, 796 n. II
(7th Cir. 1979); Battle v. Clark Equipment Co., 579 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir. 1978). The other
well-known labor law source, C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (1971) [hereinafter cited
as MORRIS], was never cited.
35. See note 16 supra.
36. Section 2(3) defines "employee" as follows:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall
include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection
with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not
obtainedany other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of
any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or
any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an
employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
37. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976); GORMAN, supra note 32,
at 27.
38. See note 36 supra.
39. 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978). This landmark decision has been followed by the Ninth
Circuit in NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Comment, 10 RUT.CAM. L.J. 747 (1979).

40. Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976), sets forth the
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the bargaining representative of the company's 4 1 production and maintenance employees. The result of the election had been six votes for the
union and one against it.42 The company objected to the election on
two grounds: 4 3 1) six of the seven eligible voters were illegal aliens; and
2) the union representative had told these undocumented workers that
the union would secure proper INS 4 4 clearance so that they and their

families could work and reside in the United States. The regional director 45 overruled the objections because the witnesses denied that the
union representative made any such statements about INS documentation.4 6 In order to secure judicial review of the election certification,
the company refused to bargain with the union. 4 7 The Board then
found that the company breached its duty to bargain in good faith with
the representative of the employees.4 8 The Board asked the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to enforce its remedial
bargaining order49 and the company defended on the grounds that the
50
Board's certification of the union was invalid.
In this case of first impression,5 ' the company in Sure-Tan argued
procedure for Board certification of an election victor. The union in Sure-Tan was Chicago
Leather Workers Union, Local 431, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North
America, AFL-CIO. 583 F.2d at 355 n.l.
41. The "company" was both Sure-Tan, Inc. and Surak Leather Co., which the Board found
to be a "single integrated enterprise." Id at 357.
42. Id
43. Id
44. Immigration and Naturalization Service [hereinafter referred to as INS]. This agency is
responsible for inspecting the documentation of persons entering or leaving the United States, and
is charged derivatively with administering all laws relating to immigration and naturalization including deportation. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1357, 1551-1557 (1976).
45. The Regional Director of the NLRB reviews objections to elections. NLRB Case Handling Manual 13,940; see GORMAN, supra note 32, at 48.
46. Had there been such a misrepresentation, the question of whether the misrepresentation
constituted unlawful campaign activity destroying the "laboratory conditions" of the election
would have been presented. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948). See
also notes 113-124 infra. If the Company or the Union had alerted the immigration authorities in
order to discourage or encourage union activities, that would have been an unfair labor practice.
National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(l), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3),
158(b)(1) (1976). See also Mike Yurosek & Sons, 225 N.L.R.B. 148, 92 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1976);
Professional Research Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 512, 89 L.R.R.M. 1624 (1975). Query whether a Gissel
bargaining order would ever be issued in such a situation. See text accompanying notes 132-35
infra.
47. Direct judicial review of representation decisions is not available under the Act, as such
decisions are not "final orders" as required in sections 10(e) and 10(f). 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), 160(f)
(1976). AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). A company which wishes to give a court test to an
election outcome must refuse to bargain with the victorious union. The union will then charge the
company with a refusal to bargain in violation of section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), to
which the company will raise the defense of an invalid election. GORMAN, supra note 32, at 59-60.
48. Sure-Tan, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 138, 96 L.R.R.M. 1506 (1977).
49. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978).
50. See note 47 supra.
51. 583 F.2d at 358.
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that Board certification of the union would run afoul of federal immigration laws which require that an alien who enters the United States to
perform work must obtain an appropriate certificate from the United
States Secretary of Labor.
In rejecting this argument, the Seventh Circuit in Sure-Tan relied
on a strict reading of the Act, deference to the long-standing position of
the Board, and federal immigration policy.5 2 The court noted that the
section defining "employee" is written broadly, without expressly excluding aliens. 53 Because of that far-reaching definition, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that it was appropriate to defer to the body "charged
with the administration of enforcement of the statute . . . unless there
are compelling indications that it is wrong." 54 The court did not make
an extensive or incisive analysis of this deferral. However, the court in
Sure-Tan did make some modest comments about the relationship between this ruling and the observance of immigration laws. Acknowledging that the undocumented workers are wrongdoers, the court noted
that their inclusion in the statutory definition of "employee" would not
55
benefit their own wrongdoing so much as it would benefit the union.
The wrongdoers are subject to deportation-and were actually deported in this case-while the certification of the union remains. The
court in Sure-Tan predicted that denying employee status to undocumented workers would actually encourage illegal immigration, since
the denial would then act as an incentive to employers to hire undocumented workers in order to avoid unionization. 56 The court also censured the company for its knowing employment of undocumented
workers and found the company's argument that certification would
57
conflict with immigration laws "unbecoming.
The bargaining order was enforced, notwithstanding the deportation of the aliens. The consistent position of the Board has been that
employee turnover is normally irrelevant to the question of union majority status: absent objective evidence to the contrary, new employees
are presumed to support the union in the same percentage as did the
workers they replaced.5 8 This presumption is particularly apt during
52. Id at 358-61.
53. Id at 359.
54. Id, citing Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals, 523 F.2d
25, 36 (7th Cir. 1975).
55. 583 F.2d at 360.
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id at 361, citing Dynamic Machine Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 1140, 91 L.R.R.M. 1054 (1975),
enforced, 552 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977).
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the insulated period of the certification year.5 9
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Wood disagreed with the decision
reached by the majority in Sure-Tan. Judge Wood concluded that,
"[t]he six had no right to be here, no right to the jobs, and consequently
no right to make determinations binding on the respondents' business
'60
long after their deserved departure.
Analysis of NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc.
In Sure-Tan, the Seventh Circuit did not adequately analyze the
relevant statutory and case law in four major areas. First, the court
found the aliens in Sure-Tan to be "employees" under the National
Labor Relations Act without making a distinction between undocumented and documented aliens. Next, the Seventh Circuit did not consider the impact of deportation on the purposes underlying the
National Labor Relations Act. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit's opinion also did not adequately address the conflict between Board action
and federal immigration laws. Finally, the court's extension of the unlawful aliens' constitutional rights to include statutory rights under the
National Labor Relations Act is incorrect. A more thorough examination of these issues by the Seventh Circuit could have resulted in a new
election or a limited bargaining order, either of which would have been
a more appropriate result.
Undocumented Aliens as Employees: A Closer Look
A major factor in the Sure-Tan decision was the Seventh Circuit's
deference to "the longstanding and consistent interpretation by the
Board

. .

. that aliens are employees under the Act.

....

,,61

Both the

63
62
cases cited by the Sure-Tan court as well as other Board opinions,
show clearly that this statement is hyperbole.
The earliest Board decision concerning the status of aliens was
rendered in 1944 in Logan v. Paxion.64 There, the Board stated that
non-citizenship should not disqualify a worker from voting in a repre59. 583 F.2d at 361, citing Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98 (1954).
60. 583 F.2d at 362.
61. Id at 359.
62. Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214, 94 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1976); Handling
Equipment Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 64, 85 L.R.R.M. 1603 (1974); Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 202
N.L.R.B. 1094, 82 L.R.R.M. 1784 (1973); Seidmon, Seidmon, Henkin & Seidmon, 102 N.L.R.B.
1492, 31 L.R.R.M. 1464 (1953); Cities Service Oil Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 324, 25 L.R.R.M. 1112 (1949).
63. See, e.g., American Smelting & Refining Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1489, 31 L.R.R.M. 1463
(1953); Azusa Citrus Assoc., 65 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1946); Allen & Sandilands Packing Co., 59
N.L.R.B. 724, 15 L.R.R.M. 170 (1944); Logan & Paxton, 55 N.L.R.B. 310, 14 L.R.R.M. 20 (1944).
64. 55 N.L.R.B. 310 (1944).
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sentation election. It is not possible to discern from the reported decision, however, whether the Logan aliens were lawfully admitted to the
United States or not. The Board's ruling in Logan, that there should be
no distinctions based on citizenship, was predicated on an earlier case
in which the Board refused to use race as a factor in unit determinations.6 5 The subsequent history of Board findings of the employee status of aliens is similarly uninstructive. 66 It was not until 1973, in
Lawrence Rigging, Inc. ,67 that the Board clearly decided that aliens
without working papers are employees under the Act. 68 However, the
strength of that rule was undercut in the 1974 decision of Handling
Equipment Corp.69 Citing Lawrence Rigging, Inc., the Board in HandlingEquipment decided that workers without valid working papers are
nonetheless employees under the Act. 70 The evidence in Handling
Equipment was insufficient, however, to establish that the employees in
question were unlawfully employed. 7 1 Of even greater significance was
the Board's statement that, because there was no finding of discriminatory discharge, "[we] do not reach the question whether the 12 [undocu72
mented] employees are entitled to the protection of the Act."
The quite apparent implication of these cases is that aliens who
can be shown to have no right to be working in the United States may
not be regarded as statutory employees. 73 Thus, although the Seventh
Circuit in Sure-Tan was correct in stating that there is a long-standing
Board rule that aliens are entitled to the protections of the Act, there is
no such rule respecting undocumented workers that is likewise "consistent and long-standing." Rather, the rule that undocumented workers
are statutory employees was conceived in 1973: since that time, the rule
has been inconsistently applied and poorly developed.

65. U.S. Bedding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 382, 13 L.R.R.M. 10 (1943).
66. The only possible exception is Seidmon, Seidmon, Henkin & Seidmon, 102 N.L.R.B.
1492, 31 L.R.R.M. 1464 (1953), but the case involved Estonian citizens who were alleged to be
disqualified from voting because they were "enemy aliens." The Board allowed them to vote in
the representation election.
67. 202 N.L.R.B. 1094, 82 L.R.R.M. 1784 (1973).
68. However, the Board erred in citation. It claimed to rely on American Smelting & Refining Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1489, 31 L.R.R.M. 1463 (1953), but the case should have been Seidmon,
Seidmon, Henkin & Seidmon, 102 N.L.R.B. 1492, 31 L.R.R.M. 1464 (1953).
69. 209 N.L.R.B. 64, 85 L.R.R.M. 1603 (1974).
70. Id. at 65 n.5, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1604.
71. Id
72. Id
73. It is interesting to note that despite the vacillation from 1973 to 1974, the Board stated
quite strongly in 1976 that unlawful aliens are employees under the Act. Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214, 94 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1976).
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Deportation: Impact on the Underlying Purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act
The purposes of the Act were not fully considered by the Sure-Tan
court. In Sure-Tan, the court correctly noted that "employee" is
broadly defined by the Act. 74 However, for at least two reasons, the
court should have examined this definition: 75 1) the definition is little
76
more than a tautology, ie., "employee" shall include any employee;
and 2) the interpretation of difficult terms must be made in harmony
with the underlying purposes of the Act, which support unionization
77
and collective bargaining.
The Sure-Tan case saw a union victory brought about by the vote
of undocumented workers. The company's workforce was composed
almost exclusively of aliens who had no right to be in this country.
Thus, Sure-Tan presents the extreme situation of a workforce majority
consisting of undocumented workers electing union representation that
cannot represent these same workers because of actual deportation.
Nonetheless, as a result of the Seventh Circuit's enforcement of the
Board order, the union became statutorily entitled to represent, vis-avis an unwilling company, 78 employees whose preference for such representation is unknown. Granted, such an outcome does support
unionization, 79 but does it effectuate the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act? And if not, what other result would?
At the outset, it should be recognized that the analysis of the undocumented worker situation is quite different from that of the lawfully
admitted alien, primarily because of the former's precarious presence
in this country. That precarious presence severely impacts upon the
section 7 rights of both the undocumented workers and all other workers in the unit, as will be developed below.
What are the section 7 rights that can be exercised by aliens who
are eventually deported because they lack valid work certificates? Such
74. See note 53 supra.
75. Of course, the Board should have examined the definition in the first instance. Ordinarily, the courts will defer to Board determinations of who are "employees," the reason being
Board expertise in evaluating the constituent factors. The question will usually be one of fact.
However, the interpretation of "employee" in this instance is rather one of law. See generally
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 332 U.S. II1 (1944).
76. See note 53 supra.
77. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 332 U.S. 111 (1944); National Labor Relations
Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
78. Of course, whether or not the company is willing or eager to bargain is irrelevant. The
company has the duty to bargain with the representative chosen by the employees in the unit.
National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(5), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1976).
79. See text accompanying notes 17 and 18 supra.
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persons can organize, as was done in and sanctioned by Sure-Tan. But
these employees cannot bargain collectively. They will not be here to
bargain. Without the ability to bargain collectively and to engage in
concerted activity, the right to organize is feeble indeed. This was rec80
ognized by Congress in enacting the National Labor Relations Act.
The underlying purposes of the Act were not served by the Seventh Circuit in Sure-Tan when the court granted employee status to
undocumented workers who were subject to deportation. The purpose
of encouraging unionization must be seen in conjunction with the purpose of encouraging collective bargaining. Unionization without the
possibility of collective bargaining by the very persons who brought in
the union makes a mockery of the statute and of congressional intent.
It is contrary to national objectives to promote unionization without the
concommitant national objective of freedom of association and worker
free choice.
Thus far, the analysis of the section 7 rights of the undocumented
aliens, as in Sure-Tan, has been premised upon the eventual deportation of the aliens. How would this analysis differ if it were assumed,
perhaps correctly, that not every company will, upon losing the representation election, see that its workers are deported? 8' Given the duty
to bargain asserted by Sure-Tan, there may be no practical incentive
for the company to call the INS: it must bargain with the union anyway, whether it hires a new workforce or not. These undocumented
workers might then stay in this country indefinitely. Therefore, why
should they not be accorded the protections of the National Labor Relations Act? Again, it is because these rights can be but poorly exercised. The paramount motive impelling aliens to seek entry into the
United States is to take advantage of the higher wages available. 82 The
perceived---even if not real-threat of deportation can be expected to
cause the undocumented workers to keep quiet about what they would
otherwise demand in the negotiation and administration of a collective
bargaining agreement. Not only is the undocumented alien unable to
80. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
81. The company here did hire a new workforce, which is rumored to be Spanish-speaking.
Remarks, John Marshall Labor Law Symposium, March 31, 1979, Chicago, Illinois. See also note
45 supra. It is clear that any action by either the company or the union to interfere with employee
free choice is an unfair labor practice. See note 46, supra. However, the Board is powerless to
effectively remedy such injustice if the employees are subject to deportation.
82. See, e.g., Salinas & Torres, The UndocumentedMexican Alien: A Legal, Social,and Economic Analysis, 13 Hous. L. REV. 863, 864 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Salinas & Torres].
See also Kane & Velarde-Muftoz, UndocumentedAliens and the Constitution: Limitationson State
Action Denying Undocumented ChildrenAccess to Public Education, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 461,
466 (1978).
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bargain collectively with any real power, but he or she is similarly impotent to engage in concerted activity. 83 The alien, as an employee, has
the right to strike, 84 but this action would imperil the alien's presence in
the workforce. A vindictive employer would alert the immigration authorities. The weakened workers are then a serious liability to the entire bargaining unit. The strength of the lawfully present workers will
be sapped by the fears of the undocumented aliens.
The real distinction, therefore, between granting and denying employee status to the undocumented worker, in terms of the section 7
rights of these workers, is that employee status gives them the right to
organize, while the absence of such status precludes their organization.
Regardless of employee status, undocumented workers will not have
the effective right to bargain collectively and engage in protected concerted activity.
It would be tolerable to grant the section 7 rights to undocumented
aliens, even though the rights would be more apparent than real, were
it not for the fact that this benefit to the illegals has its price: 1) it is at
the expense of the representational choice of the workers who succeed
them (assuming eventual deportation of the aliens); or 2) it is at the
expense of the organizational strength of the lawfully present workers
in the unit (assuming merely a perceived threat of deportation).
Granted, denying employee status to undocumented workers does
have important disadvantages. The company may well try to avoid
unionization by hiring the undocumented. However, an aggressive
union can make the call to the INS. If the union persists, the company
will eventually have a lawfully-constituted workforce. If the undocumented are denied employee status, they can be discharged or otherwise discriminated against for union support. They will have no right
to organize. However, it is unlikely that this abuse will be any greater
than-and will not add to-the current exploitation of the employee's
83. Protected concerted activity for mutual aid, as envisioned by section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, supra note 15, includes solicitation, organization, bargaining, and protesting
employer practices, as by striking. See GORMAN, supra note 32, at 296-325. A tremendous body
of law has developed delineating the line between protected and unprotected activity. Id Unprotected activity includes "a slow-down, sit-down strike, wildcat strike, damage to business or to
plant equipment, trespass, violence, refusal to accept work assignment, physical sabotage, refusal
to obey rules and other such activities." Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 238 F.2d 188, 193 (9th
Cir. 1956).
84. Again, only certain kinds of strikes are protected. See note 79, supra. The economic
strike to support bargaining demands and the strike to protest unfair labor practices are protected.
National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1976),
as interpreted by NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50 (1972).
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fear of deportation. 85
If undocumented workers could actually exercise the rights named
in section 7, it would make sense for all concerned to accord them employee status. The benefits to the undocumented workers are obvious. 86 There are also benefits to both the union and the other workers
in the unit, both of whom have an interest in the working conditions of
the undocumented. 87 That interest is to prevent unjust competition
from exploited workers. If the undocumented could flex their section 7
muscle, they would not present unfair competition, nor would they be
88
exploited-nor would they be hired in the first place.
But what of the notion that jurisdiction of the NLRB is fundamenwithout which a worker is powerless to assert the most basic rights
in employer-employee relations? In the context of the undocumented
worker, the powerlessness results from the immigration laws, not from
any basic defect in the labor laws. To try to use the National Labor
Relations Act to promote the working rights of the undocumented as in
Sure-Tan is to disregard reality. Those rights cannot be fulfilled unless
the worker is assured of a continuing right to be present in order to
exercise those rights. Because of the Immigration Act, 90 there is no
such right of an illegal alien to remain in the United States. Consequently, there is then no power to exercise the rights granted by the
National Labor Relations Act.
tal, 89

Conflict With Federal Immigration Laws
The Seventh Circuit in Sure-Tan speculated that denying employee status would actually encourage illegal immigration, since unscrupulous employers might increase alien employment opportunities
in order to avoid dealing with a union. However, any union desirous of
organizing a plant worked by aliens could force a restructuring of the
workforce by a well-placed call to the INS. 9 1 Since unions are gener85. See generally Salinas & Torres supra note 78.
86. See generally notes 16-17 supra.
87. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353
U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
88. See generally Salinas & Torres, supra note 78, at 876-78.
89. The Board has jurisdiction over "employees." National Labor Relations Act §§ 9, 10, 29
U.S.C §§ 159-160 (1976). See note 16 supra.
90. Immigration and Nationality Act § 281, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976).
91. It has been suggested that whichever party-the union or the company-fears an election
loss will call the Immigration and Naturalization Service. One labor law practitioner has stated
that most of the calls are from unions. Remarks, John Marshall Labor Law Symposium, March
31, 1979, Chicago, Illinois.
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ally opposed to liberalization of immigration laws, 92 it is not unlikely
that such action would be taken, both for political and practical reasons. Deportability remains a device to be exploited by whichever
party finds it expedient.
The Seventh Circuit in Sure-Tan insisted that its holding was not
inconsistent with federal immigration laws.9 3 But this insistence is belied by the Board's own argument in the case. The Board argued in
Sure-Tan that it was not responsible for administering or enforcing the
laws and regulations of other government agencies. 94 The Seventh Circuit found this argument unnecessary 95 since it found that there was no
conflict between the labor laws and the immigration laws. Despite the
court's speculation, it is difficult to imagine how giving to undocumented aliens the status of labor law employees discourages illegal immigration. And it is clear that Board certification of a union that does
not actually enjoy majority status (as can easily happen after the aliens
are deported) in no way comports with national labor law.
Although the court concluded otherwise, the Board in Sure-Tan
was prepared to acknowledge that its position conflicted with federal
immigration laws. The Board insisted, as it had in the case of Handy
Andy, 9 6 that it should not be charged with enforcing the laws and policies of other federal agencies. Assuming, arguendo, the premise of conflict between federal immigration and labor laws, what is the propriety
of the Board's decision?
In the landmark Handy Andy9 7 decision, the Board reversed its
prior Bekins rule, 98 and refused to consider in a representation proceeding a claim of union discrimination on the basis of race. 99 In other
words, the Board will now certify a union charged with invidious discrimination; it will not investigate such a charge in a representation
92. See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,353 (1976); Report on ActivityatAFL-ClO's 12th
Biennial Convention, 1977 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 218, 221, 230 (1978).

93. 583 F.2d at 359-60.
94. Id
95. Id
96. 228 N.L.R.B. 447, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354 (1977).
97. Id
98. The Eighth Circuit first promulgated the rule in NLRB v. Mansion House Center Mgt.
Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973). The Board adopted the rule in Bekins Moving & Storage Co.,
211 N.L.R.B. 138, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974). Under these cases, the Board would make a precertification inquiry into whether the Union was responsible for invidious discrimination. If it
was, certification would be denied.
99. Although Handy Andy involved only racial discrimination, its rationale would presumably apply to other types of invidious discrimination. See 228 N.L.R.B. at 451, 94 L.R.R.M. at
1358.
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proceeding. Among the many reasons' 0 0 for this decision was that jurisdiction over claims of racial or other invidious discrimination have
been vested exclusively in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.' 0 ' In Handy Andy, the Board made it clear that it "neither
approve[s] nor condone[s] discriminatory practices on the part of the
"o102 It was also clear that the Board would consider such
unions ....
charges in their normal unfair labor practice proceedings, 0 3 but that
the Board considered the charges inappropriate in a representation
case. 104
HandyAndy is inapposite to the Sure-Tan situation, both in policy
and in law. The demise of Bekins was foreshadowed by NLRB v. Sumter Plywood Corp. 'o in its understanding of the problems of considering racial discrimination charges in representation cases. In Sumter,
the Board stated that:
Because individual employees who believe that they have been victims of racial discrimination practiced by a union have remedies
under Title VII .

. .,

or through unfair labor practice complaints

I the "drastic step" of refusing to certify a union should be taken
only in response to a strong demonstration the union has in fact endiscriminatory practices, and is likely to
gaged in a pattern of racially
0 6
continue such practices.

In part, then, it is the "availability of alternative remedies to individual
employees victimized by discrimination. .. 107 that made the Board
reluctant to deny certification to an allegedly discriminatory union.
Handy Andy did not see the Board eschewing altogether allegations of discrimination. The Board continues "to police the conduct of
certified unions as it relates to their duty of fair representation"1 08 and
is the proper forum for claims of invidious forms of discrimination in
100. The Board cited several other reasons for its decision: certification does not constitute
state action; the issuance of certification to a victorious union is mandated by the National Labor
Relations Act; prompt certification facilitates collective bargaining; the Bekins doctrine was ineffective in implementing an antidiscrimination policy; the Bekins doctrine can create problems of
interpreting section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act; Bekins utilized proof of discrimination at other plants
and in other bargaining units, whereas the Board's findings and remedies are to apply only to the
particular parties before it; the union had actually represented the minority employees adequately;
and representation cases must be resolved expeditiously. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211
N.L.R.B. 138, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974).
101. Commonly referred to as the EEOC.
102. 228 N.L.R.B. at 456, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1363.
103. Id
104. Id
105. 535 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977). Sumter applied the
Bekins rule.
106. 535 F.2d at 931, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976) and United Rubber Workers v.
NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
107. 535 F.2d at 931.
108. 228 N.L.R.B. at 448, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1356.
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the context of unfair labor practice proceedings. More important,
Handy Andy recognized that "in their respective areas of authority the
Federal agencies have overlapping responsibility ... .,"109
The purpose of Handy Andy, then, was to acknowledge the appropriate separation of powers of the federal agencies, but the particular
federal agencies in that case were seen as having common goals. Thus,
whereas both the National Labor Relations Board and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission are concerned about eradicating
invidious discrimination, the goals of the National Labor Relations
Board and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, given the SureTan outcome, are mutually inconsistent. The NLRB, by conferring
benefits on the illegal aliens, frustrates the INS, which wants to return
the aliens and halt illegal immigration. Because of these fundamental
differences, the Board cannot use Handy Andy to bolster its wish to
confer employee status on undocumented workers.
Constitutional Considerations
The Seventh Circuit in Sure-Tan correctly noted that aliens are
entitled to certain constitutional rights."10 As stated by the United
States Supreme Court, all aliens present"' within the jurisdiction of the
United States can claim the protections of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments:
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the
United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . . Even one
whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary,
or transitory
2
is entitled to that constitutional protection."
However, that constitutional protection does not accord ipso facto
aliens unlawfully within the United States the right to be considered
employees under the National Labor Relations Act.' ' 3 According to
the United States Supreme Court, the category of "aliens" "is itself a
heterogeneous multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of ties
109. Id at 451, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1358. See also NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S.
662, 665 (1976) (while the FPC has no power to promulgate rules prohibiting its regulators from
practicing employment discrimination, it may consider the economic consequences of such discrimination in performing its regulatory functions).
110. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 355, 359 (7th Cir. 1978), citing Matthews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976).
Ill. Obviously, aliens in other countries are beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Act, as well as any other American law.
112. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
113. National Labor Relations Act §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
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to this country."" 4 Congress cannot only establish categories of alienage, but may extend different privileges to them." 5 The Congress or a
state may, for example, accord disparate benefits to different classes of
resident aliens and deny them altogether to unlawful aliens:
Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign
power, the resident diplomat, nor the illegalentrant, can advance even
a colorableconstitutionalclaim to a share in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some of its
guests.' 16
Since the illegal entrant cannot make claims, short of the denial of
due process, against the state or Congress, it is difficult to argue that the
illegal entrant can claim the protections of the National Labor Relations Act. Employee benefits under the Act are purely statutory; there
is no constitutional impediment to depriving illegal aliens of NLRA
employee status.
Remedial Possibility: A New Election
If the court in Sure-Tan had held that undocumented workers are
not employees under the National Labor Relations Act, the year of certification would have presented no bar to holding a new election, and
the Board's rule that normal employee turnover does not affect the presumption of continued majority status would have been likewise inappropriate. A new election then would have been ordered and the
outcome would clearly reflect the employees' free choice.
However, even with the court's finding that the undocumented are
statutory employees, it would have been possible-and desirable-for
the court to find that a new election should be held. This could have
been done in one of two ways, both of which would require the Board
(or the court) to break new ground.
The Board in Sure-Tan could have found that the election was
invalid. Finding the original election to be invalid obviates the need to
circumvent the irrebuttable presumption of majority status, as well as
the one-election-per-year rule, since the invocation of either presupposes a valid prior election.' 17
The recent General Knit, Inc. I8 decision of the Board might have
provided a tool for finding the Sure-Tan election invalid. GeneralKnit
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1976) (citations omitted).
Id at 78-80.
Id at 80 (with the exception of "some," emphasis supplied).
See generally GORMAN, supra note 32, at 52-59.
239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978).
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resurrected the Hollywood Ceramics Co. 119 standards for campaign
propaganda, according to which an election will be set aside by the
Board if there existed substantial campaign misrepresentations likely to
20
have had a significant impact on the outcome of the election.
The Board in General Knit believed that the Hollywood Ceramics
standards were necessary to ensure fair elections.' 2 ' Since the Board
has found it imperative to take a more active role in assessing campaign propaganda and its impact on an election, it could go one step
further and fashion a rule that voting by undocumented workers requires heightened scrutiny of the campaign. By this rule, the Board
could administratively notice that an alien electorate is likely to taint
the election. This tainting results from both the threats of deportation,
by whomever made, and whether express or not, 122 as well as from the
fact that counting such votes will not ensure a free and fair election to
more permanent employees whose working conditions otherwise could
23
be bound by the choice of deported or threatened aliens.
Perhaps the better way to have ordered a new election in SureTan, given the holding that the illegal aliens are employees, would
have been for the Board to carve an exception to its presumptions of
continued majority status. The Board should be able to order a new
election where the original election is immediately followed by a turnover of the majority of the voting workforce, particularly where the turnover is occasioned by the deportation of the voters. This kind of
turnover should constitute "unusual circumstances"1 24 making the year
of certification irrebuttable presumption nugatory. Moreover, this pe119. 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962). More specifically, the Board in Hollywood
Ceramics stated that:
[A]n election should be set aside only where there has been a misrepresentation or other
similar campaign trickery, which involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a
time which prevents the other party or parties from making an effective reply, so that the
misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not, may reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the election.
Id at 224.
The Hollywood Ceramics decision had been widely criticized as unnecessarily and mistakenly
involving the Board in evaluating campaign conduct. See studies cited in Shopping Kart Food
Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1312-13 n.12-22, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1706-07 n.12-22 (1977), particularly J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW
AND REALITY (1976). It was overruled by a new Board in Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977) and finally revived by General Knit, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B.
No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978).
120. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978).
121. Id. at 1688.
122. See note 87 supra. See also Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1962).
123. See note 87 supra.
124. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-102 (1954). The unusual circumstances noted by the
Court were (1) defunctness or dissolution of the union; (2) substantial schism within the union;
and (3) rapid fluctuation in the size of the bargaining unit within a short time. I am suggesting
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culiar employees' departure should easily rebut the presumption that
normal turnover is irrelevant to the union's majority status: there is
25
nothing normal about this employee turnover.
Since the only routes to holding a new election while at the same
time according employee status to the aliens involve significant departures from established rules, the departures may well open a Pandora's
box. 126 In Sure-Tan, it would have been more direct and efficacious to
simply hold that undocumented alien workers are not employees under
the National Labor Relations Act.
Remedial Possibility: A Limited Bargaining Order
An alternative solution to the anomaly of granting section 7 rights
to the deported aliens in Sure-Tan would have been for the Board (or
court) 127 to tailor its bargaining order to the facts of the case. The
Board has broad discretion in fashioning bargaining orders, 28 subject
129
to limited judicial review.
(quite halfheartedly, since I prefer denying employee status to the undocumented) that unit employee deportation on the eve of an election be recognized as a fourth unusual circumstance.
125. One of the reasons that the Sure-Tan court would not rebut the presumption of the
union's continued majority status was the Board's rule that normal employee turnover does not
affect majority status: absent unusual circumstances, the new employees are presumed to support
the union in the same ratio as those employees they have replaced. This presumption promotes
industrial stability. After all, if the presumption is false, it is incumbent upon the employees to file
a decertification petition or present objective evidence to the company of the union's new status.
However, this presumption loses its sensibility when unusual circumstances are present, as where
the employee turnover follows on the heels of the deportation of the employees who voted in the
union.
In a somewhat analogous case in the Eighth Circuit, the court spurned the Board's self-created presumption, which, according to that court, was no where mandated by statute. The presumption that employees support the union in the same proportion as the employees they have
replaced belongs only to the "normal turnover" situations. National Car Rental System v. NLRB,
594 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1979) (turnover occasioned by the hiring of all new permanent replacements for all striking employees). However, such a presumption can be "so far from reality," as to
produce "ridiculous" results. Id. at 1206. That is exactly what happened in Sure-Tan. The limits
of this presumption should be recognized in the Seventh Circuit.
126. It would certainly invite litigation of "unusual circumstances" and could well deter the
prompt performance of bargaining obligations.
127. This would have been done pursuant to judicial review in unfair labor practice cases.
See note 47 supra.
128. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 193 (1941).
129. Id at 197. The Board could have, as part of its remedial authority, ordered a new election. This may not be a useful or economic remedy if the company has hired a new workforce
again consisting of undocumented workers. However, the possibility that the new aliens will not
be deported offers some justification for such a remedy. Perhaps the Board could condition voter
eligibility on lawful presence in the United States, but this seems a circuitous method of saying
that the illegals are not employees. It would be an obvious conflict with federal immigration
policy for the Board to order the rehire of those deported, or to find it an unfair labor practice to
alert the INS of the aliens' presence. Likewise would be any Board action forbidding a party to
call the INS as part of the bargaining order. One administrative law judge issued a bargaining
order and a requirement that the illegal aliens be preferentially reinstated if and when their pres-
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In Sure-Tan, a recalcitrant company and an unknown workforce
were required to bargain. It would be possible to interpret "employee"
to include the undocumented, as was done in Sure-Tan, but to deny a
bargaining order if the undocumented (which had been a majority of
the election-time workforce) have ceased working at the establishment
within a determined time frame. The one-election-per-year rule could
then simply be waited out, with a new election to come upon the proper
indications of the employees. If, however, the undocumented remain
in the workforce, a bargaining order would be appropriate. Again, the
solution is far inferior to a simple recognition that undocumented
workers are not statutory employees.
Conclusion
Whether as a reinterpretation of "employee" or a creative remedial order, 130 in dealing with the rights of undocumented workers
under the National Labor Relations Acts, attention must be paid to the
underlying purpose of the Act. This purpose is to accord workers the
basic section 7 rights, including full freedom of association and choice
of a bargaining representative. Legislative history and the Act itself
make it clear that the Act is "a bill of rights both for American workingmen and for their employers."' 3' It is by no means a bill of rights
for unions not selected by the majority of employees in the bargaining
unit. The statutory bias in favor of collective bargaining and unionization is the servant of the policy of worker free choice. Thus, when the
rights of the union conflict with the basic rights of the workers, the
former must give way. Where granting employee status to undocumented workers results in augmentation of union power at the obvious
expense of the individuals' free choice of a bargaining representative,
then something has gone wrong in implementing national policy.
ence in the United States became lawful. Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 214, 94
L.R.R.M. 1165 (1976).
130. Board remedial orders are to restore rights lost rather than to deter or to punish. International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 980 (1969). However, several cases express an interest in deterrence. See, e.g., Walgreen
Co. v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1975).
131. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 144 (1957). In finding that undocumented aliens are entitled to employee status, the Seventh Circuit was forced to dismiss "some
contrary hints about the legislative history in distinguishable Supreme Court opinions." NLRB v.
Sure-Tan, Inc., 583 F.2d 355, 359 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979). It suggested that the above quoted reference
to American workingmen "may have meant only that the workers be American residents." Id
That begs the question of how lawful that residence must be, and shuns the more difficult task of
determining congressional intent.
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DENIAL OF GISSEL BARGAINING ORDERS AND
OTHER BOARD SET-BACKS

Gissel Bargaining Order Cases
A union may attain representative status either by informal recognition,132 by winning a representation election, 33 or by securing bar-

gaining rights through unfair labor practice proceedings. 134 The latter
involves the issuance of what is known as a Gissel bargaining order:
Where the employer has been guilty of unfair labor practices during an
election campaign, and the effect of those practices has been to dissipate the union's prior majority status and to make a fair election impossible, the Board will require the company to bargain with the union
135
as a remedy for the company's unfair labor practices.
The Board is somewhat aggressive in issuing Gissel bargaining orders. 36 It is, however, often unsuccessful in getting judicial enforcement of these orders. 3 7 Such enforcement was denied by the Seventh
38
Circuit this past year in First Lakewood Associates v. NLRB.
In First Lakewood Associates, the company's alleged section
8(a)(1) violations 39 were coercive interrogations of employees, surveillance of union activities and the promise of benefits to those employees
who would vote against the union. 140 The election was held and the
union lost.' 4 ' The Board then issued a Gissel bargaining order pursu132. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) gives exclusive bargaining
power to "[riepresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes .
Id. The Act does not
I..."
require formal election of the bargaining representative. See GORMAN, supra note 32, at 40;
MORRIS, supra note 34, at 246, citing H.R. CON. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, June 3,
1947, 1 NLRB Legis. Hist. 545.
133. GORMAN supra note 32.
134. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
135. Id Where the employer's unfair labor practices have been so egregious and pervasive, a
bargaining order may be issued without proof of an earlier majority status only if coercive effects
of unfair labor practice could not be eliminated by traditional remedies. NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., Id. at 613-14. See generaly GORMAN, supra note 32, at 93-131.
136. Tipton Electric Co., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 101 L.R.R.M. 1154 (1979); Naum Bros., Inc.,
240 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 100 L.R.R.M. 1219 (1979); Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 100
L.R.R.M. 1118 (1978).
137. See Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Armcor Industries,
Inc., 535 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1976); Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir.
1973).
138. 582 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978).
139. Section 8(a)(l) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ..
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
140. 582 F.2d at 417-18.
141. Id. at 421.
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ant to the unfair labor practice proceedings. 42 The Seventh Circuit
denied the bargaining order, 143 ruling that the Board's determination
44
that the unfair labor practices would make a fair election unlikely1
was unsupported by specific findings. 45 The court would not accept
what it characterized as the Board's "substitution of conclusion for ex46
planation." 1
The Seventh Circuit itself then analyzed the propriety of the Gissel
bargaining order in First Lakewood Associates; a not uncommon, but
questionable, judicial exercise. 4 7 The court concluded that the impact
of the threats by the company had been diminished prior to the election. 4 8 Thus, the Seventh Circuit determined that the better remedy
would be a new election rather than enforcement of the bargaining order. 149
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Gissel bargaining order in Medline Industries,Inc. v. NLRB.' 50 In Medline, the
court found that since the administrative law judge had improperly excluded two employees from the bargaining unit and included one invalid authorization card,' 5' the union did not have the majority support
required for a Gissel bargaining order. 52 Although the court usually
142. Id
143. Id at 424.
144. In the common Gissel situation, the Board is required to make specific findings concerning the impact of the unfair labor practices on the election process, as well as a detailed analysis of
the possibility of holding a fair election. Id at 423, citing Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484
F.2d 1108, 1118 (7th Cir. 1973).
145. The Board did not detail the future impact of these violations, nor did it evaluate the
effectiveness of less drastic, alternate remedies. 582 F.2d at 423.
146. Id., citing Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1119 (7th Cir. 1973).
147. Although the United States Supreme Court declared in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575 (1969), that the Board is to determine whether a bargaining order should be issued, many
courts make the determination de novo. See GORMAN, supra note 32, at 96-104.
148. The Seventh Circuit noted that the threats, for the most part, ceased about six weeks prior
to the election. Thus, the residual impact of such threats was diminished. Moreover, at least two
employees did not hesitate to openly express their union support after these threats occurred. 582
F.2d at 424.
149. Id
150. 593 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1979).
151. Id. at 796. The authorization card was secured by the union's misrepresentation that
everybody in the unit had already signed the card, which in itself is enough to invalidate a card.
The union also misrepresented that the unambiguous card was to be used solely to obtain an
election. Id. at 793-94. But see Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268, 54 L.R.R.M. 1233
(1963).
152. The real problem in Medline appeared to be the credibility of the administrative law
judge. Ordinarily, the judge is entitled to deference. In Medline, however, the judge had discredited the testimony of the employee who had signed the card under pressure and because of the
misrepresentations. The basis of the discredit, according to the judge, was the employee's " 'embarrassed posterings and facial configurations,' and the fact that he 'is still in [the company's]
employ and testified under its watchful eye ....
" 593 F.2d at 795 n.8.
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defers to Board expertise in unit determination, the Seventh Circuit in
Medline concluded that the Board had acted arbitrarily by improperly
classifying a warehouse worker (a category included in the unit) as a
clerical employee (an excluded category) when she worked only peripherally as a clerical employee. The court also overruled the Board's
exclusion of an employee who was on sick leave. 53 Regarding the invalid authorization card, the Seventh Circuit refused to defer to the
judgment of the administrative law judge, noting that the judge's ac54
tions were based on apparent hostility towards the company.
Considering both the First Lakewood Associates and Medline
opinions, it is somewhat surprising that the Seventh Circuit approved
the bargaining order in C& W Super Markets, Inc. v. NLRB.155 C&W
Super Markets involved the question of whether certain persons who
had solicited authorization cards were "supervisors."'' 56 This is a crucial issue because supervisors are excluded from the definition of "employee" and thus are not entitled to the protections of the National
Labor Relations Act. 157 Supervisors can be discharged or otherwise
discriminated against for their union activities. 58 Furthermore, they
are not entitled to vote in union representation elections. 59 With regard to solicitation of authorization cards, such cards which are solicited by supervisors may be found to be invalid. 160 Thus, where the vote
is close, the status of supervisor vel non may well be outcome determinative.
In C& W Super Markets, the Board found that certain employees
were not supervisors and thus those authorization cards solicited by the
employees could be included in the majority. The Board also concluded that the company had engaged in coercive conduct which had
153. That an employee on sick leave is entitled to unit inclusion is well-established. Id at 791.
The only reason there was any question here was that the company had instituted a new policy by
which employees who are ill for more than twenty-one days are terminated. However, this policy
did not apply to employees hired before the policy's inception. Id at 792.
154. Id at 795.
155. 581 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1978).
156. Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act defines supervisor as follows:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976).
157.

158.
159.
160.
freedom

See GORMAN, supra note 32, at 34.

Id at 35.
Id
The rationale for this rule is that employees solicited by supervisors are deprived of their
of choice. 581 F.2d at 620.
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dissipated the union's majority and made a fair election impossible.' 6'
The Board saw a bargaining order as the major requirement to both
cure past and deter future violations of the Act. 162 However, the Board
in C& WSuper Markets failed to make the required "detailed analysis"
of the issues in the case.' 6 3 In particular, the Board did not make
specific findings concerning the adequacy of less drastic remedies.
The Seventh Circuit in C&W Super Markets v. NLRB 64 upheld
the issuance of the bargaining order. 165 Unlike First LakewoodAssociates and Medline, the court deferred to the "informed discretion" of
the Board' 166 Thus, since the employees in question were found not to
be supervisors, the effect of their solicitation of authorization cards was
resolved against the company, i.e., cards solicited by them were considered valid and were counted in determining whether the union enjoyed
majority support. The court in C& WSuper Markets, however, did not
address the Board's failure to make a detailed analysis of the issues in
the case, apparently because the Board's conclusion was considered
reasonable by the court. In sum, while the Seventh Circuit correctly
deferred to the Board's conclusion that the employees were not supervisors, the court in C& W Super Markets upheld the validity of the bargaining order without requiring the Board to present an analysis of
other, less drastic remedies, one of which might have been more appropriate than the bargaining order.
Other Board Set-backs
Regarding Board set-backs by the Seventh Circuit during 1978-79,
two other cases must be noted. In Cerlo Manufacturing Corp. v.
NLRB, 167 the court set aside a rerun election which had been ordered
by the Board because of a technical deviation from procedure. This
deviation had been caused by the Board's failure to mail a copy of the
official notice of election to the company. Despite the technical deviation, all of the eligible employees voted in the first election which the
161. Id at 623. The coercion included coercive interrogation, threats, discharges and other
discrimination, blatant attempts to find "legitimate" reasons for discharging union adherents, and
unlawful promises of benefits for opposing the union. Id at 623-24.
162. Id at 625, citing Walgreen Co. v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975) as the
Seventh Circuit's interpretation of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1968).
163. 581 F.2d at 625. Under Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), the
Court's review was limited to whether the Board's determination was supported by "substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole."
164. 581 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1978).
165. Id at 625-26.
166. Id. at 622-23.
167. 585 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1978).
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union lost. In addition, all employees signed statements 6 8 that they
had learned of their rights in the election either from the company's
unofficial notice of the election 69 or elsewhere. Nonetheless, the Board
ordered a rerun election which was won by the union.
The Seventh Circuit in Cerlo set aside the rerun election and upheld the original election which was lost by the union. 70 In so holding,
the court concluded that the union had been unable to show any bad
faith on the part of the company or any harm to employee rights by the
failure of the Board to send, and the company to post, the official notice. 17 Thus, the Board's rerun election and subsequent union victory
were nullified by the Seventh Circuit.
In NLRB v. Mosey Manufacturing Co., 72 the Seventh Circuit was
presented with the issue of Board policing of campaign propaganda. In
1978, the Board, in the case of GeneralKnit, Inc.,173 had reasserted its
active role in the policing of such propaganda 74 by reviving the standards set forth in Hollywood Ceramics Co. 175 Mosey involved a remand to the Board for consideration of the union's alleged campaign
misrepresentations in light of General Knit. The Seventh Circuit refused to apply the Hollywood Ceramics standards in Mosey. In so doing, the court remarked that the Board has an "on-again, off-again"
policy 176 of policing campaign propaganda and that the court would
177
not enter this "foray."'
EXHAUSTION OF INTERNAL UNION REMEDIES AND THE GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURE:

NEW EXCEPTIONS AND A FUNDAMENTAL
DIFFERENCE

Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies
The Seventh Circuit in 1978-79 continued to follow the well-established rule that exhaustion of internal union remedies is a prerequisite
to a suit by the union member against the union, at least where the
168. The statements signed by the employees were solicited by the company, but with no evidence of abuse on the part of the company. Id at 848.
169. The company's own posted notice contained substantially all of the information of the
official notice, at least all the information relevant to the context of the election. Id at 848-49.
170. Id at 850.
171. Id at 849-50.
172. 595 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1979).
173. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 101, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978).
174. In reasserting its prior active role in the policing of campaign propaganda, the Board
overruled Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977).
175. 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962).
176. 595 F.2d at 378.
177. Id at 377-78.
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internal remedies are adequate, fair, and reasonable. 78 A more difficult question is whether a company can raise as a defense the individual's failure to exhaust intra-union remedies. The Seventh Circuit in
Baldini v. Local Union No. 1095179 appears to permit the company to
raise such a defense in certain instances.
In Baldini, the union officials told the aggrieved employee,
Baldini, that the proper steps had been taken to obtain arbitration of
his discharge for theft. This was incorrect, however, and Baldini
missed the time period in which to request arbitration. Baldini then
sued the union for breaching its duty of fair representation and the
company for wrongful discharge. The district court dismissed the suit
180
against the union and granted summary judgment to the company.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of the union suit because
of Baldini's failure to exhaust the "fair and adequate" internal union
procedures. 18 The district court's grant of summary judgment to the
company, however, presented a more complex issue since the company
had raised Baldini's failure to exhaust internal union remedies as a defense.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits have ruled that nonexhaustion of remedies is never a defense
for a company defendant. 82 The rationale for this rule is that exhaustion of the union procedure is purely a concern of the union. The Seventh Circuit itself, in Harrison v. Chrysler Corp.,183 held that the
defense is unavailable to the company. In Harrison,the Seventh Circuit stated that:
[Ain employer cannot, strictly speaking, raise the contractual defense
available to the union, because it is not a party to the union's contract
with the member . . . It is also clear that the employer cannot assert the policy of avoiding judicial interference with internal union
affairs to the extent that the policy serves only the interest of the
to assert
union. Under the traditional rule, a litigant lacks standing
84
interests which are exclusively those of a third party.'
The Seventh Circuit in Baldini found that the company does have
178. Baldini v. Local 1095, UAW, 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978); Battle v. Clark Equipment Co.,
579 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1978). There is an exception where the public policy issues outweigh
private contract rights. NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
179. 581 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1978).
180. 435 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
181. 581 F.2d at 149.
182. Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972); Retana v. Local No. 14,
Apartment, Motel, Hotel & Elevator Operators Union, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972); Brady v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
183. 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977). The Harrison case was limited to its facts.
184. Id at 1278 (citations omitted).
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a legitimate interest in the exhaustion of internal remedies in certain,
limited cases, 85 as where the use of the internal procedures could revive the grievance.186 The court in Baldini held, however, that because
it was too late for Baldini to request arbitration, and thus revive the
grievance, nonexhaustion of internal remedies could not be used as a
defense by the company. 87 Thus, the Seventh Circuit in Baldini parted
with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits 18 8 by holding that a company's
nonexhaustion defense is limited to those instances in which the internal procedures could revive the grievance. According to the Seventh
Circuit, the nonexhaustion defense is completely inapplicable where
the union can no longer revive the grievance procedure as was the situation in Baldini.
Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures
If a collective bargaining agreement between the company and the
union provides that a dispute be subject to a grievance and arbitration
procedure, the company can require that that procedure be utilized.' 89
If the grievance procedure has not been utilized, the individual cannot
directly sue the company for breach of contract concerning the dispute. 190 Where, however, the union fails to fairly represent the aggrieved employee, the employee is then allowed to sue the company
directly, without completing the grievance and arbitration process.' 9 '
The Seventh Circuit fashioned a second exception to the rule
against a direct suit against the company in Battle v. Clark Equipment
Co. 192 In Battle, the employees sued both the union and the company;
the former for breach of the duty to fairly represent and the latter for
breach of contract. The basis of the claim was the mutual modification
by the company and the union of unemployment benefits to be distrib185. The Seventh Circuit added that such an interest had been noted in the Harrison decision
as well. 581 F.2d at 150.
186. The Seventh Circuit stated that where the use of the internal procedures could revive the
grievance, "an employer's right to expect primary use of such procedures is quite directly implicated, and it may insist that union remedies be attempted for this purpose." Id.
187.

Id

188. See note 177 supra and accompanying text.
189. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).
190.

See id.

191. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
192. 579 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1978). See Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870
(3d Cir. 1972), citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (exceptions to the duty to exhaust contractual remedies include employer repudiation of the grievance procedure, arbitrary union handling
of the grievance, and futility). Accord, Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972),
Retana v. Local No. 14 Apartment, Motel, Hotel & Elevator Operators Union, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th
Cir. 1972).
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uted pursuant to a plant closing. 193 The district court granted summary
judgment to the union. 94 The Seventh Circuit in Battle affirmed the
summary judgment to the union because the employees had failed to
exhaust the adequate and available intra-union remedies.' 95
On the issue of summary judgment for the company, however, the
Seventh Circuit excused the employees' failure to use the grievance
procedure under the collective bargaining agreement. The court determined that if the employees had used the grievance procedure it would
have necessarily involved proof of wrongdoing on the part of the
union. 96 The Seventh Circuit concluded that:
This leads to the anomalous result that, because of the union's indispensable role in shepherding a grievance through the various levels
of the grievance machinery a successful prosecution of the appellants' grievances would depend on the union aggressively proving its
own misconduct. . . .We do not believe that the law of the exhaustion of contract remedies
requires the appellants to place themselves
97
in such a position. 1
That the claim against the union was dismissed because of failure
to exhaust internal union remedies while the employees were excused
from pursuing the contractual grievance procedure was noted by the
court as "a possible inconsistency,' 98 since the union's proof of its own
wrongdoing would be necessary in either situation. The Seventh Circuit in Battle, however, justified this inconsistency by distinguishing between internal union remedies and grievance procedures:
[T]here are important differences between the two situations. The
intra-union remedies are set up on the assumption that there is a
disagreement between the local union leadership and the employee.
The contract grievance procedures assume an absence of such a conflict. The intra-union exhaustion requirement is based in part on the
policy of permitting the union to attempt to resolve internal problems
in house before they are brought to the public courtroom. In contrast, pursuit of a grievance through the grievance machinery would
require the union to publicly declare its own wrongdoing. 199
193. 579 F.2d at 1341-42.
194. Id. at 1342.
195. Id. at 1344.
196. Id at 1345. The Seventh Circuit's reasoning was an interpretation of the United States
Supreme Court's suggestion in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), that there may be circumstances
under which "the individual employee may obtain judicial review of his breach-of-contract claim
despite his failure to secure relief through the contractual remedial procedures." 579 F.2d at 1346,
citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-85 (1967).
197. 579 F.2d at 1345.
198. Id at 1346 n.10.
199. Id The Seventh Circuit added:
Lastly, since the union plays the role of sole advocate of the grievant's cause under the
contract remedies, any functional conflict of interest would mean that the grievant's case
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The new ground broken by the Battle result, along with the availability of a company's nonexhaustion defense in Baldini, illustrate that
the Seventh Circuit intends to set its own precedents in these areas. It
will be interesting to watch for future developments by the court in the
doctrines of exhaustion of union remedies and the exhaustion of grievance procedures.
OTHER SEVENTH CIRCUIT LABOR LAW CASES IN BRIEF

The Seventh Circuit reached decisions in several other areas of
labor law during 1978-79 which merit comment. Briefly, these cases
involved the duty of fair representation, settlement agreements, "confor union
tracting out,"
2oo accretions to the workforce, and discrimination
activities.

Duty of FairRepresentation
Allegations that a union breached its duty of fair representation by
attaching impossible conditions to a reinstatement agreement settling a
might not be made with adequate forcefulness. In the intra-union remedies, the employee can present his own case.
Id
200. Additional labor law decisions by the Seventh Circuit in 1978-79 include: NLRB v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 599 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1979) (a company must bargain with the negotiators selected by the employees, even though the company fears that the selection of the
negotiators is a strategy to force coordinated bargaining, which, of course, a union may not force
in derogation of established bargaining units); Woodlawn Hospital v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 1330 (7th
Cir. 1979) (strikers in health care institutions who were properly discharged before the effective
date of the Health Care Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)
and (g) (1976), for unprotected activities were not statutory employees; therefore, the employer's
nondiscriminatory refusal to reinstate such strikers after the effective date of the amendments did
not violate the Act); Larkins v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1979) (right of the union to enforce
valid union security agreements upheld where the union demanded and received the discharge of
an employee who failed to make a timely tender of union dues and fees); Milwaukee Newspaper
& Graphic Communications Union Local 23 v. Newspapers, Inc., 586 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1979)
(where a contract contains an interest arbitration clause, inclusion of such a clause in subsequent
contracts is not arbitrable); NLRB v. Knuth Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1978) (court enforced Board's order that the company pay pro-rata vacation benefits to replaced strikers, up to
the time of the strike); Barbour v. Central Cartage, Inc., 583 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1978) (while the
standards governing a district court's grant of injunctive relief under section 10(j) is a source of
controversy among the circuits, the question here is moot since the section 10(j) injunction lapses
upon the Board's ruling on the underlying charge); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Local 627, Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 581 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1978) (prerequisites for section 301 jurisdiction met by a
contractual provision whereby, following deadlock, either party may take "all lawful economic
recourse;" that recourse can include filing suit); Eaton Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers, 580 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1978) (Boys Market exception to section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976), requires, as a precondition to any strike injunction, that both parties be contractually bound to arbitrate, not that both parties be capable of
initiating arbitration over the particular dispute; to hold otherwise subverts the policy that the
arbitration clause is the quidpro quo for the no-strike clause), citing Avco Corp. v. Local 787,
UAW, 459 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1972)).
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grievance were made in Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers. 20 The agreement provided that the discharged employee, Archie, would get his job
back only if he signed a statement that he would agree to be terminated
in the event of any recurrence of improper tallying of freight for a period of one year. Archie erred during that one year period by sending a
shipment intended for Hawaii to New York. 20 2 Archie was then discharged and the union refused to process his grievance. The district
court dismissed Archie's suit against the union for breach of the duty of
fair representation. In so holding, the court stated that the plaintiff, in
order to show the union's breach, had to show that the union's conduct
20 3
was motivated by bad faith.
The Seventh Circuit in Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers2°4 held
that dismissal of the suit was improper. 20 5 The court concluded that
the district court had erred in requiring the plaintiff to show that the
union's conduct was based on bad faith. Rather, the Seventh Circuit
found that the charge of unfair representation requires a showing that
20 6
the union's conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.
In NLRB v. PPG Industries, Inc.,207 the Seventh Circuit emphasized the flexibility permitted the union in carrying out its duty to fairly
represent all employees in the unit. 208 The court in PPGIndustries refused to require the union to adopt an "adversary stance" vis-,A-vis the
employer "from the moment a claim is made by an employee. ' 20 9 Such
a requirement, the court concluded, would lead to a breakdown in the
210
informal resolutions of disputes.
201. 585 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978). The real significance of this case is in the law of employment discrimination. The court, speaking through Judge Reynolds, refused to read into title VII
the doctrine of constructive receipt of notice from the EEOC of the individual's right to sue. This
liberal construction of title VII means that the ninety-day limitations period begins to run on the
date the claimant actually receives the letter from the EEOC. The notice in Archie had been
mailed to the claimant's home, but received by his wife, who did not bring the letter to his attention for nine days.
202. id at 223.
203. Id at 219.
204. 585 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978).
205. Id at 220. The Seventh Circuit determined that the complaint was sufficient to state a
cause of action. Id
206. Id at 219, citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See also Floeter v. C.W. Transport,
Inc., 597 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1979) (per the United States Supreme Court decision in Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976), an employee cannot proceed directly against his or
her employer without first establishing that the union's representation in the arbitration procedure
was "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith") 597 F.2d at 1102. Accord, Barton Brands, Ltd. v.
NLRB. 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976); Orphan v. Furnco Construction Corp., 466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir.
1972); Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972).
207. 579 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1978).
208. Id at 1059.
209. Id
210. Id at 1059-60. The court in PPG Industries also noted that where the Board and the
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In an era of rising numbers of claims of unfair representation,
these cases illustrate that the Seventh Circuit has properly focused on
the fairness of the union representation rather than on the outcome of
the representation. Thus, the emphasis of the court is on whether the
union fairly represents its members and not on whether the union wins
every grievance.
Settlement Agreements
In NLRB v. Key Motors Corp.,211 the Seventh Circuit held that
where a Board-approved settlement agreement includes a bargaining
provision of uncertain duration, but the agreement does not arise out of
or concern a claim of refusal to bargain, the Board may not order the
employer to bargain for a reasonable time after the settlement agreement where the union loses majority support about one month after the
agreement. 21 2 Key Motors Corp. involved the loss of majority support,
evidenced by statements from a majority of the employees that they did
not want the union to represent them. 2 13 The Seventh Circuit concluded that where the bargaining provision in the agreement does not
clearly define the duration of the provision or, at least, require a reasonable time even in the absence of union majority support, the employer must bargain in good faith until such time as the employer has a
2 14
reasonably based, good faith doubt of the union's majority status.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Key Motors Corp. is particularly logical where the Board is in a position to require the durational language
in any settlement agreement to be subject to its approval.
The distinction between Board-approved settlement agreements
and out-of-Board settlement agreements was raised in NLRB v. Vanadministrative law judge differ, the evidence must be examined more closely by the court to see if
it is substantial. Id at 1058.
There were two other less significant Seventh Circuit cases concerning adequacy of representation. The grievance procedures adopted for nonpreference-eligible postal employees by the U.S.
Postal Service and the union do not violate either the fair hearing requirements of the Postal
Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1976), or the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
even though the procedure does not allow the individual to be present, give testimony, and crossexamine witnesses. The individual was, in law, given the opportunity to be heard through the
representative of his own choosing, namely, the union. Postal employees thus receive a fair hearing through their union representative. Winston v. United States Postal Service, 585 F.2d 198 (7th
Cir. 1978). Similarly, actual notice need not be given a railway employee where the union is
authorized to represent the employee. O'Neill v. Public Law Bd. No. 550, 581 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1978).
211. 579 F.2d 1388 (7th Cir. 1978).
212. Id
213. Id. at 1391.
214. Id.

334
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tran Electric Corp. 215 According to the Vantran court, the Board-approved settlement agreement "manifests an administrative
determination . . . that some remedial action is necessary to safeguard
the public interests intended to be protected by the National Labor Relations Act. ' 2 16 Obviously, there is no such Board determination in
out-of-Board settlement agreements.
In Vantran, the Board ordered the employer to bargain with the
union for an extended certification year as a remedy for the employer's
withdrawal of recognition after the employer had entered into a settlement agreement with the union. 21 7 The out-of-Board settlement provided for the dropping of the union's unfair labor practice charges and
the employer's dismissal of its damage claim for strike misconduct in
state court. It was undisputed that within four and one-half months
after the execution of the agreement, the union lost its majority sup2 18
port.
The issue before the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Vantran Electric
Corp.21 9 was whether the withdrawal of the recognition was lawful
since it conflicted with the bargaining provisions of the settlement
agreement. The Vantran court reached its decision by drawing a distinction between Board-approved agreements and out-of-Board agreements. The court determined that where the settlement agreement is
out-of-Board, it must be carefully scrutinized "to determine the intended scope of the bargaining provision." 220 The court contrasted
such agreements to Board-approved settlements containing such provisions, for with such approval, the "parties are more likely to have intended the scope of that bargaining duty to satisfy Board standards. '22'
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the employer's agreement to
bargain was "incidental" to the union's dropping the unfair labor prac215. 580 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1978).
216. Id at 924, citing Poole Foundry & Machinery Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
217. 580 F.2d at 922.
218. Id at 923.
219. 580 F.2d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 1978).
220. Id at 924.
221. Id In determining the scope of the out-of-Board bargaining provision, the Seventh Circuit stated that:
An important factor. . . is whether the employer's agreement to bargain was a quidpro
quo for the union's agreement to withdraw its § 8(a)(5) charge. If it was, the parties
probably intended that the employer fulfill a bargaining obligation that it allegedly violated, which would, for example, justify bargaining for an extended certification year. If
it was not, the intent of the parties would be less clear and the burden would be on the
Board in seeking enforcement to show that the scope of the bargaining obligation was
broader than the literal language of the provision indicated.
Id at 924-25.
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tices charges; what the union was really seeking in the agreement was
the company's dismissal of the damages action. 222 In other words, the
quidpro quo for the union's agreement to withdraw the unfair labor
practices charge was the employer's agreement to have the damages
action dismissed. Therefore, the non-Board settlement agreement did
not actually settle the pending unfair labor practice charges. 223 In effect, the Board exceeded its remedial authority by ordering bargaining
for the extended certification year. 224 The Seventh Circuit based its

decision in Vantran on the need to settle disputes without governmen225
tal intervention.
"Contracting Out"
In American Cyanamid Co. v. NLRB, 226 the Seventh Circuit up227
held the Board's finding that the company violated sections 8(a)(1)
22
8
and 8(a)(5)
of the National Labor Relations Act by contracting out
maintenance and service work on a permanent basis during a strike
without first notifying and bargaining with the union. 229 This practice,
in effect, converted the lawful economic strike into an unfair labor
practice strike. The company in American Cyanamid sought to confine
the United States Supreme Court decision in FibreboardPaper
Products
Corp. v. NLRB 230 to situations in which there had been no strike and to
23
rely on the Ninth Circuit decision in Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB 1
2 32
which permits unilateral contracting out during a strike.
The Seventh Circuit in American Cyanamid found this reliance
222. Id at 925.
223. Id.
224. Id
225. The Seventh Circuit concluded:
If the Board perceived the need to intervene to protect the public interest, one of its
important responsibilities, the appropriate time for such intervention was when the
union requested it to withdraw charges and dismiss the complaint against the employer.
At that time the Board could have refused . . . unless the settlement agreement was
amended to include a bargaining obligation for an extended certification year.
Id
226. 592 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1979).
227. See note 139 supra for the text of section 8(a)(l) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
228. Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . to refuse to bargain collectively
with the repsentatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a) . ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
229. 592 F.2d at 357-58.
230. 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (contracting out of work normally done by unit employees is a
mandatory subject of bargaining).
231. 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963).
232. 592 F.2d at 360.
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misplaced. 233 The court determined that Fibreboard held only that
such contracting out was authorized to enable the employer to continue
operating in the emergency situation created by the strike. 234 The
American Cyanamid situation, on the other hand, was one where the
company had made a unilateral decision to make the arrangement permanent in the absence of an emergency. 235 Thus, the strike in American
Cyanamid was characterized by the Seventh Circuit as an "unfair labor
practice strike" and the employees were entitled to reinstatement upon
236
their unconditional back-to-work offer.
Accretions to the Workforce
In Lammert Industries v. NLRB, 237 the company closed down its
Chicago and Westwood plants and opened in their place the Addison
plant. On the date of the opening of the Addison plant, nineteen employees from the formerly union-represented Chicago plant and seven
employees from the non-union Westwood plant constituted the
workforce. 238 The company refused to recognize and bargain with the
union that had represented the employees at the Chicago plant. The
Board held that the relocation was merely a continuation of the old
Chicago plant so that the Westwood employees became an accretion to
the Chicago workforce. Thus, the Board concluded that the company
23 9
was obligated to bargain with the union.
The Seventh Circuit in Lammert Industries v. NLRB 240 affirmed
the Board's decision, deferring to the Board's expertise in the determination of accretions to the workforce. 24 1 This affirmation rejected the
company's argument that a contrary result was mandated by the fact
233. Id.
234. Id
235. Id The Seventh Circuit found that Hawaii Meat merely answered in the negative the
question of "whether a decision to subcontract, taken at the time an economic strike occurs, and
madefor thepurpose of keeping theplant operating,constitutes a failure to bargain... " Id. at
361 n.7 (emphasis added), citing Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 397, 399-400 (9th Cir. 1963).
236. 592 F.2d at 364. During settlement negotiations, the company attempted to condition
allowing the employees back to work on their waiver for one year of the right to change any
matter covered by the settlement agreement. The company was not permitted to do this in light of
the unfair labor practice strikers' unconditional offer to return to work. The company had argued
that since it could have locked out the employees, it could impose reasonable conditions upon
their return to work. The court acknowledged this novel argument but was not required to "decide under what circumstances an employer might be able to convert an economic strike to a
permissible lockout or what conditions, if any, short of reaching agreement on the economic issues
it might attach to ending such a lockout." Id
237. 578 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1978).
238. See id. at 1224.
239. See id. at 1225.
240. 578 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1978).
241. Id at 1225-26. This is similar to the court's deference to the Board regarding the deter-
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that within five months of the opening of the new plant, the workforce
consisted of sixteen former Chicago employees, seven non-represented
employees from Westwood, and ten employees who had never voted in
a union election. The crucial date, according to both the Board and the
Seventh Circuit, was the date of the new plant opening. 24 2
DiscriminationFor Union Activities

In W W Grainger,Inc. v. NLRB, 24 3 the Board determined that
where a supervisor fired a known union adherent for soliciting during
work hours, the discharge was motivated by discrimination for union
activities because the supervisor did not investigate the incidents that
were used as grounds for the discharge. 244 The Board also found that
24 5
the company maintained an unlawfully broad no-solicitation rule
extending to an employee's free time and that it discriminatorily applied a rule against solicitation during working hours.246 The Seventh
Circuit in Grainger affirmed the Board's finding 24 7 of violations of sections 8(a)(3) 248 and 8(a)(5) 249 of the National Labor Relations Act.
Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB 50 involved a Board decision which held that a short suspension period for union stewards and
officers who participated in an unlawful strike was inherently destructive to employee rights under section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act 25 ' since the union rank-and-file were not similarly suspended. The
Seventh Circuit reversed the Board. In so doing, the court noted that
"the higher responsibilities of union officials justify disciplining them
mination of bargaining units. Id.,citing NLRB v. R.L. Sweet Lumber Co., 515 F.2d 785, 794
(10th Cir. 1975).
242. 578 F.2d at 1226. The affirmation in Lammert Industries was also in spite of the fact that
within the six months prior to the relocation, the union had lost a decertification election. However, this election had been set aside by the Board because of company coercion. Id at 1224. The
court noted that any other result would invite abuse.
243. 582 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1978).
244. Id at 1121.
245. Id. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1954).
246. The company allowed unrestricted discussion during work time as long as the employees
continued their work uninterrupted, but prohibited the discussion when it involved the union. 582
F.2d at 1120, 1120 n. 3.
247. Id at 1118.
248. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization . ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
249. For the text of section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1976), see note 228 supra.
250. 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979).
251. For the text of section 7, see note 16 supra. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
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more severely than rank-and-file members for participating in unprotected activity." 252 Under IndianaMichigan & Electric, the company is
permitted to come forth with evidence that there is a legitimate and
substantial business justification for the discrimination between union
officers and the rank-and-file, as long as such discrimination is not in25 3
herently destructive of important employee rights.
CONCLUSION

The majority of the 1978-79 labor law decisions by the Seventh
Circuit were based on established precedent, illustrating that the court
is in the mainstream of national labor relations law. The Seventh Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., however, which granted undocumented alien workers protection under the National Labor
Relations Act, breaks new ground in labor relations. This significant
decision invites serious reconsideration of the underlying purposes of
the National Labor Relations Act.

252. 599 F.2d at 230.
253. Id at 231-32.

